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Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the problem of statistical model
checking (SMC) for hyperproperties. To reason about probabilistic hy-
perproperties, we first propose the temporal logic HyperPCTL∗ that ex-
tends PCTL∗ and HyperPCTL. We show that HyperPCTL∗ can express
important probabilistic information-flow security policies. Then, we in-
troduce SMC algorithms verifying HyperPCTL∗ formulas on for discrete-
time Markov chains, based on sequential probability ratio tests (SPRT)
with a new notion of indifference region. Our SMC algorithms can handle
both non-nested and nested probability operators for any desired signifi-
cance level. Finally, we evaluate our SMC algorithms on four case studies:
time side-channel vulnerability in encryption, probabilistic anonymity in
dining cryptographers, probabilistic noninterference of parallel programs,
and the performance of a randomized cache replacement policy.
1 Introduction
Hyperproperties [14] extend trace-based languages by allowing explicit and si-
multaneous quantification over temporal behavior of multiple execution paths.
In hyper temporal logics [15,4], atomic propositions associated with different
paths in combination with other logic operators specify the relations between
different paths for every time instance. Hyperproperties can describe important
information-flow security policies, such as non-interference and differential pri-
vacy as well as correctness conditions in concurrent computing [10], and cyber-
physical systems [25], which are not definable by trace-based languages.
In the context of stochastic systems, the temporal logic HyperPCTL [4] has
been proposed to express and reason about probabilistic hyperproperties. The
model checking algorithm for HyperPCTL utilizes a numerical approach that it-
eratively computes the exact measure of paths satisfying relevant sub-formulas.
Numerical algorithms tend to work only for special systems that have certain
structural properties and require a lot of time and space, often running into
scalability issues. On top of this difficulty, another major challenge in verifying
hyperproperties, is that the computation complexity for exhaustive verification
grows at least exponentially in the number of quantifier alternations of the input
formula [6,15,9].
A different popular approach in dealing with probabilistic systems is to use a
sample-based approach, where one asserts whether or not the system satisfies a
property by observing some of its executions. This approach is known as statisti-
cal model checking (SMC) [20,27,26], which has the clear advantage of improved
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scalability. The general idea of SMC is to treat the problem of checking a tempo-
ral logic formula on a probabilistic system as hypothesis testing problems [23,5].
By drawing samples from the underlying probabilistic system, the satisfaction
of the formula can be inferred with high confidence levels. To the best of our
knowledge, the work on SMC for hyperproperties is limited to [25], where the
authors propose an SMC algorithm for a limited type of hyperproperties using
Clopper-Pearson (CP) confidence/significance levels.
In this paper, we study the SMC problem for hyperproperties with proba-
bilistic guarantees. To this end, we first introduce the temporal logic HyperPCTL∗
on discrete-time Markov chains that extends PCTL∗ [8] by allowing quantification
over paths and HyperPCTL [4] by allowing nested probability and temporal oper-
ators. We also illustrate that HyperPCTL∗ can elegantly express properties such
as generalized probabilistic causation, countermeasures for side-channel attacks,
probabilistic noninterference, and probabilistic independence among execution.
Different from [25], we propose an SMC algorithm for probabilistic hyper-
properties using sequential probability ratio tests (SPRT) [21,26]. Based on a
new notation of indifferent region, the new SMC algorithms verify a HyperPCTL∗
specification to arbitrarily small (non-zero) significance levels, and are generally
more sample efficient than the CP confidence level based SMC approach.
To apply SPRT for verifying HyperPCTL∗ formulas, the main challenge is
to handle joint probabilities, which translates to a hypothesis testing in multi-
dimension. Our remedy is to extend the notion of indifferent region from one-
dimension to multi-dimension; then, we identify two most indistinguishable sim-
ple hypotheses across the indifference region by their likelihoods. By applying
SPRT to these two simple hypotheses, we provide exact probabilistic guarantee
for verifying non-nested HyperPCTL∗ formulas. Nested formula in HyperPCTL∗,
constructed by either (i) replacing a sub-formula with a non-nested formula, or
(ii) quantifying free path variables in a non-nested formula, are handled in the
same way as [25].
We have fully implemented our algorithms and report results of four case
studies. Specifically, we apply the algorithms to four case studies: the time side-
channel vulnerability in encryption [13,24,1], probabilistic anonymity in dining
cryptographers [12], probabilistic noninterference of parallel programs [17],
and the performance of a random cache replacement policy [11]. The simulation
results show that the proposed SMC algorithms provide the correct answer with
the desired significance levels in all cases, while requiring very short analysis
times.
Organization. This paper is organized as follows. We start with the prelimi-
naries in Section 2. HyperPCTL∗ is introduced in Section 3 and its expressiveness
is discussed in Section 4, before illustrating its use in Section 5. SMC algo-
rithms for HyperPCTL∗ are introduced in Section 6. Finally, we show applicability
of our verification methods in Section 7, before concluding remarks in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries
We denote the set of integers and real numbers by N and R, respectively. Let
N∞ = N ∪ {∞}. For n ∈ N, let [n] = {1, ... , n}. The indicator function is denoted
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by I. The cardinality of a set is denoted by |·|. For n ∈ N∞, we use s = (s1, ... , sn)
to denote a tuple, and use S = s(0)s(1) ... to denote a sequence. The i-suffix of
the sequence is denoted by S(i) = s(i)s(i+1) .... For any set D ⊆ Rn, we denote
its boundary, interior, and closure by ∂D, D◦, and D, respectively.
2.1 Labeled Discrete-Time Markov Chains (DTMC)
A (labeled) DTMC is a tuple M = (S,T,AP, L) where
– S is a finite set of states;
– T : S×S → [0, 1] is the transition probability function with
∑
s′∈S T(s, s
′) =
1 for any state s ∈ S;
– AP is a set of atomic propositions;
– L : S → 2AP is a labeling function.
A path of a DTMC M is of the form S = s0s1 · · · , such that for every i ∈ N, we
have (1) si ∈ S, and (2) T(si, si+1) 6= 0. By Paths(s), we denote the set of paths
of a DTMC that start from state s. Similarly, by Paths(M), we mean the set of
all paths of DTMC M.
2.2 Sequential Likelihood Ratio Test (SPRT)
SPRT statistically resolves two simple hypothesis
H0 : p = q, H1 : p = r. (1)
For example, let p = (p1, ... , pn) ∈ [0, 1]n be the means of n Bernoulli random
variables B1, ... , Bn. For each i ∈ [n], let Ui,1, ... Ui,Ni be Ni independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples of Bi. To resolve (1), SPRT compares the
log-likelihood ratios:
λ(p) = ln
( ∏
i∈[n]
pTii (1 − pi)
Ni−Ti
)
, p = (p1, ... , pn), for p = q or r (2)
where Ti =
∑
j∈[Ni]
Ui,j for i ∈ [n].3 The SPRT algorithm achieves the upper
bounds αFP and αFN on the false positive (FP) and false negative (FN) ratios,
i.e.,
αFP = Pr{assert H1 |H0 is true}, αFN = Pr{assert H0 |H1 is true}, (3)
if it stops and asserts by


stop and assert H0, if λ(p1)− λ(p0) < ln
αFP
1−αFN
stop and assert H1, if λ(p1)− λ(p0) > ln
1−αFP
αFN
draw more samples, otherwise.
(4)
3 Each Ti obeys the binomial distribution Binom(Ni, pi), where the probability mass
function of Binom(N, p) is given by fBinom(K |N, p) = C
K
N p
K(1 − p)N−K , for K ∈
[0, N ] and the binomial coefficient CKN = N !/(K!(N −K)!).
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The FP and FN ratios are also referred to as the significance levels, showing
probabilistic accuracy of the SPRT algorithm.
3 The Temporal Logic HyperPCTL∗
HyperPCTL∗ is an extension of PCTL∗ that enables handling hyperproperties. It
is also a generalization of HyperPCTL [4] that allows for nested temporal and
probability operators.
3.1 Syntax
HyperPCTL∗ formulas are defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= api | ϕpi | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ϕ U≤k ϕ | ρ ⋊⋉ ρ | ∃σpi. ϕ | ∀σpi . ϕ (5)
ρ ::= f(ρ, ... , ρ) | Ppi (ϕ) | Ppi (ρ) (6)
where
– a ∈ AP is an atomic proposition;
– pi is a random path variable from an infinite supply of such variables Π;
– and U≤k are the ‘next’ and ‘until’ operators, respectively, where k ∈ N∞
is the time bound and U≤∞ means ‘unbounded until’;
– ⋊⋉ ∈ {<,>,=,≤,≥}, which allows comparing probabilities among different
random paths;
– σ is a state variable from an infinite supply of state variables Σ, and ∀σpi
and ∃σpi stand for the universal and existential quantification of the initial
state σ of a tuple of random path variables pi = (pi1, ... , pin), respectively;
– Ppi is the probability operator for a tuple of random path variables pi, and
– f : Rn → R is a n-ary elementary function, and constants are viewed as a
0-ary function. This allows for expressing arithmetic operations and entropy
from probabilities.
More logic operators are derived as usual: true ≡ api ∨¬api , ϕ∨ϕ′ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ∧
¬ϕ′), ϕ ⇒ ϕ′ ≡ ¬ϕ ∨ ϕ′, ≤k ϕ ≡ true U≤k ϕ, and ≤k ϕ ≡ ¬ ≤k ¬ϕ. We
denote U≤∞, ≤∞, and ≤∞ by U , , and , respectively. We represent a
1-tuple by its element, i.e., σ(pi) and P(pi) are written as σpi and Ppi, respectively.
3.2 Semantics
We first define a function pv(ϕ), which computes the set of random path variables
that are associated with a probability operator, but not with a state quantifica-
tion in a formula ϕ, defined recursively by:
– pv(api) = pv(ϕpi) = ∅
– pv(∀σpi. ϕ) = pv(∃σpi . ϕ) = pv(ϕ)\pi
– pv(¬ϕ) = pv( ϕ) = pv(ϕ)
– pv(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = pv(ϕ1 U≤k ϕ2) = pv(ρ1 ⋊⋉ ρ2) = pv(ϕ1) ∪ pv(ϕ2)
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– pv(f(ρ1, ... , ρn)) =∪i∈[n]pv(ρi)
– pv(Ppi(ϕ)) = pv(ϕ) ∪ pi and pv(Ppi(ρ)) = pv(ρ) ∪ pi
The union of a set with a tuple is with the elements of the tuple.
The semantics of HyperPCTL∗ formulas is described in terms of the interpre-
tation tuple (M, X, V ), where
– M = (S,T,AP, L) is a DTMC;
– X : Π→ S is a partial state assignment that maps the first state of a random
path variable pi ∈ Π (i.e., pi(0)) to a state s ∈ S;
– V : Π→ Paths(M) is a path assignment, mapping the random path variables
to concrete paths of M, and assigning the initial state of the random path
variables to the state variables, satisfying the consistency with X , V (pi)(0) =
X(pi) for all in the domain of V .
Furthermore, we denote by J·K(X,V ) the instantiation of the assignments (X,V )
on a HyperPCTL∗ formula. The judgement rules of semantics of a HyperPCTL∗
formula ϕ are as follows:
(M, X, V ) |= api iff a ∈ L
(
X(pi)
)
(M, X, V ) |= ϕpi iff (M, X [pi′ 7→ V (pi)(0) for all pi′ ∈ pv(ϕ)], V ) |= ϕ
(M, X, V ) |= ∃σpi . ϕ iff there exists s ∈ S,
such that (M, X [pi 7→ s for all pi ∈ pi], V ) |= ϕ
(M, X, V ) |= ∀σpi . ϕ iff for all s ∈ S,
such that (M, X [pi 7→ s for all pi ∈ pi], V ) |= ϕ
(M, X, V ) |= ¬ϕ iff (M, X, V ) 6|= ϕ
(M, X, V ) |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff (M, X, V ) |= ϕ1 and (M, X, V ) |= ϕ2
(M, X, V ) |= ϕ iff (M, X, V (1)) |= ϕ
(M, X, V ) |= ϕ1 U≤k ϕ2 iff there exists i ≤ k such that
(
(M, X, V (i)) |= ϕ2
)
∧(
for all j < i. (M, X, V (j)) |= ϕ1
)
(M, X, V ) |= ρ ⋊⋉ ρ iff M |= JρK(X,V ) ⋊⋉ JρK(X,V )
M |= Jf(ρ, ... , ρ)K(X,V ) iff M |= f
(
JρK(X,V ), ... , JρK(X,V )
)
JPpi(ϕ)K(X,V ) = Pr
{
(Si ∈ Paths(X(pii)))i∈[n] |
(M, X, V [pii 7→ Si for all i ∈ [n]]) |= ϕ
}
JPpi(ρ)K(X,V ) = Pr
{
(Si ∈ Paths(X(pii))i∈[n] |
(M, X, V [pii 7→ Si for all i ∈ [n]]) |= ρ
}
where
– X [·] and V [·] stand for revising the assignment X and V by the rule given in
[·], respectively; and the consistency of X and V is implied in the revision.
– V (i) is the i-shift of path assignment V , defined by V (i)(pi) = (V (pi))(i), and
– the probability Pr is taken for an n-tuple of sample paths (S1, ... , Sn) to
instantiate pi, and “ | ” means ‘such that’, and not for conditional probability.
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s0
{a1}
s1
{}
s2
{}
s3
{a2}
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
Fig. 1. HyperPCTL∗ ex-
ample on DTMC M.
∀σ1
pi1
s
pi3
∃σ2
pi2
Fig. 2. Computation
trees for (7).
s
pi1
pi1(1)
pi2
Fig. 3. Computation
trees for (8).
3.3 Discussion on HyperPCTL∗
We start with an example. Consider the DTMCM in Figure 1, and the following
HyperPCTL∗ formula:
ϕ = ∃σpi11 .∀σ
pi2
2 .
(
P{pi1,pi2}
(
(api11 ∧ a
pi2
1 ) ∧ (a
pi1
2 ∧ a
pi2
2 )
)
> 1/6
)
.
The formula asserts that there exists a state σ, which is the initial state of path
pi1, such that for any state σ
′, which is the initial state of path pi2, the probability
that the two paths satisfy a1 initially, and a2 finally, is greater than 1/6. Clearly,
we have that M 6|= ϕ.
According to the semantics given in Section 3.2, we make the following re-
marks on HyperPCTL∗. The second rule of the semantics means that ϕpi is to
set the initial states of the random path variables in pv(ϕ) to the initial state
of pi. Therefore, (ϕ)pi is semantically equivalent to ϕ if pv(ϕ) = ∅. For exam-
ple, (api1)pi2 is equivalent to api1 and
(
∃σpi1 . (Ppi1( api1) > c)
)pi2
is equivalent to
∃σpi1 . (Ppi1( api1) > c).
Also, observe that the syntax of HyperPCTL∗ allows formulas of the form
∃σpi1 .ϕ, where ϕ does not involve the tuple of random variables pi1 at all, (e.g.,
∃σpi1 . (api2)). Semantically, this formula is equivalent to ϕ. For path quantifica-
tion, it allows formulas of the form Ppi1(ϕ), where ϕ does not involve the tuple
of random variables pi1 at all (e.g., P
pi1(api2)). Semantically, such a formula is
equivalent to ϕ.
Finally, we note that although not the main motivation, HyperPCTL∗ can
generate “grotesque” formulas like such as:
∀σpi11 . P
pi1
( (
∃σpi22 . P
(pi2,pi3)
(
api2 U api3
)
> c2
)pi1)
> c1, (7)
where the computation trees, from which pi1, pi2 and pi3 are randomly sampled
(see Figure 2). This means that for any state σ1, the probability to find a path
pi1 from σ1 to reach some state σ2 is greater than c1, where the state σ2 satisfies
that the probability is greater than c2 to find a pair of paths pi2 and pi3 from the
states σ2 and s, respectively, to satisfy formula a
pi2 U api3 .
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4 Relation to Other Temporal Logics
In this section, we discuss the relation and expressive power of HyperPCTL∗, as
compared to existing probabilistic and hyper logics.
Relation to PCTL∗. In a PCTL∗ formula, a probability operator implicitly in-
corporates a single random sample path draw from a different (probabilistic)
computation tree. In HyperPCTL∗, such random path variables are explicitly spec-
ified. For example, checking the nested PCTL∗ formula PJ1
(
(PJ2(ϕ))
)
involves
two random sample paths from a root computation tree and a sub computation
tree, respectively. Thus, in order to specify this formula in HyperPCTL∗, we need
to explicitly employ two random path variables pi1 and pi2 for the two proba-
bility operators, where sub-formula ϕ is checked on pi2 of the sub computation
tree, whose root is randomly given by pi1(1) (see Figure 3). Hence, sub-formula
(PJ2(ϕ)) is checked on pi1. The corresponding HyperPCTL
∗ formula is
Ppi1
(
(Ppi2(ϕpi2) ∈ J2)
pi1
)
∈ J1. (8)
Theorem 1. HyperPCTL∗ is strictly more expressive than PCTL∗ with respect to
DTMCs.
Relation to HyperPCTL. Similar to HyperPCTL [4], HyperPCTL∗ allows for prob-
ability arithmetic and comparison. For example, a HyperPCTL∗ formula ϕ =(
Ppi1 ( api1) − Ppi2( api2) > c
)
for some c ∈ R means the satisfaction proba-
bility of “finally a” is greater at least by c on a random path variable pi1 than
another random path variable pi2. Also, similar to HyperPCTL, HyperPCTL
∗ allows
for the existential and universal quantification of the initial states of the random
path variables, i.e., the existential and universal quantification of the root of
several comparing probabilistic computation trees.
Theorem 2. HyperPCTL∗ subsumes HyperPCTL with respect to DTMCs.
Relation to HyperLTL. A HyperLTL formula can have multiple path variables.
For example, let ϕhltl = a
pi1
1 U a
pi2
2 be a HyperLTL subformula (i.e., without path
quantification), meaning that a1 is true on pi1 until a2 is true on pi2. Like PCTL
∗ al-
lows for reasoning over the satisfaction probability of LTL formulas, HyperPCTL∗
allows for reasoning over the satisfaction probability of HyperLTL formulas. For
example, HyperPCTL∗ subformula P(pi1,pi2)(ϕhltl) > c means that the satisfac-
tion probability of the HyperLTL formula ϕhltl is greater than c. Moreover, in
HyperPCTL∗, a HyperLTL formula can be probabilistically quantified in multiple
ways. Specifically, the path variables of the HyperLTL formula can be quantified at
one time, or one-by-one in certain order. For example, instead of quantifying the
HyperLTL formula ϕ in a one-shot way for ϕhltl, HyperPCTL
∗ also allows formula
ψ1 = P
pi1
(
Ppi2 (ϕhltl) > c2
)
> c1. This means that the probability for finding path
pi1 should be greater than c1, such that the probability for finding another path
pi2 to satisfy ϕhltl is greater than c2. By flipping the order of the probabilistic
quantification for pi1 and pi2, we derive formula ψ2 = P
pi2
(
Ppi1 (ϕhltl) > c2
)
> c1.
Clearly, the meaning of ψ1 and ψ2 are different, showing the significance of the
order of the probabilistic quantification.
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5 Applications of HyperPCTL∗
We now illustrate the application of HyperPCTL∗ on four examples.
5.1 Side-channel Vulnerability
Timing side-channel attacks are possible if an attacker can infer the secret val-
ues by observing the execution time of a program. A necessary condition for
preventing such attacks requires that the probability of stopping within some
k ∈ N steps should be approximately equal for different secret values (captured
by different initial states),
∀σpi11 .∀σ
pi2
2 . P
pi1 ( ≤k Fpi1) ≈ε P
pi2( ≤k Fpi2), (9)
where the label F represents the end of execution and ≈ε stands for approxi-
mately equal within some ε > 0. If (9) holds, then an attacker cannot infer the
initial state (i.e., the secret values) from whether the program terminates in k
steps.
5.2 Generalized Probabilistic Causation
HyperPCTL∗ can express conditional probabilities over multiple independent com-
putation trees, which is not possible in HyperPCTL [4]. Probabilistic causation [18]
asserts that if cause ψpi happens, the probability of occurring an effect ϕpi should
be higher than the probability of occurring ϕpi when ψpi does not happen. We
can specify that for any two premises (i.e., initial states), ψpi probabilistically
causes ϕpi as follows:
∀σ
pi1∪pi2
1 .∀σ
pi3∪pi4
2 .
(Ppi1(ψpi1 ∧ ϕpi1)
Ppi2(ψpi2)
>
Ppi3(¬ψpi3 ∧ ϕpi3)
Ppi4(¬ψpi4)
)
(10)
In HyperPCTL∗, the cause and the effect can be hyperproperties. For example, let
pi and pi′ be two path. and ψ(pi,pi
′) = (spi ∨ spi
′
) (i.e., at least one of them is safe
at time 1) and ϕ(pi,pi
′) = (spi ∧ spi
′
) (i.e., eventually both stay safe forever).
We note that the extensions of PCTL that allow conditional probabilities from [7]
cannot properly express causation due to their non-hyper nature.
5.3 Probabilistic Noninterference
Probabilistic noninterference [19] establishes the connection between information
theory and information flow by employing probabilities to address covert chan-
nels. Intuitively, it requires that the probability of every low-observable trace
pattern is the same for every low-equivalent initial state. For example, consider
the parallel composition of the following n-threads:
Thk : for ik = 1 to (h+ 1)× k do {... ; l← (k mod 2)}, (11)
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where k ∈ [n], h ∈ {0, 1} is a secret input, and l ∈ {0, 1} is a publicly observable
output. At each step, the processor randomly chooses one thread among the
unfinished threads with equal probability and executes one step of the for-loop
(including the assignment of l), until all the n threads are finished. The DTMC
describing the change of the values of the variables (i1, ... , ik, ... , in, h, l) is
Pr
(
(i1, ... , ik + 1, ... , in, h, k mod 2) | (i1, ... , ik, ... , in, h, l)
)
= 1/|{k ∈ [n] |ik < (h+ 1)× k}|,
(12)
where initial values of the variables are 0, except for h being either 0 or 1.
As the threads have different numbers of loops depending on h and the
scheduling is uniformly random, the whole process is more likely to terminate at
a thread with more loops, whose thread number is partially indicated by l. This
opens up the possibility that by observing l, an attacker can infer the difference
in the number of loops among the threads, and hence infer h. On the other hand,
the attack cannot happen if the probability of observing L0 : l = 0 or L1 : l = 1
is independent of whether initially H0 : h = 0 or H1 : h = 1, i.e., the value of h
cannot be inferred from the value of l. This is formally defined by HyperPCTL∗
by:
∀σ
(pi1,pi3)
1 .∀σ
(pi2,pi4)
2 . (H0
pi1 ∧ H1
pi2 ∧ H0
pi3 ∧ H1
pi4)⇒(
Ppi1 ( L0
pi1) = Ppi2( L0
pi2)
)
∧
(
Ppi3 ( L1
pi3) = Ppi4( L1
pi4)
)
.
(13)
5.4 Dining Cryptographers
Several cryptographers sit around a table having dinner. Either one of the cryp-
tographers or, alternatively, the National Security Agency (NSA) must pay for
their meal. The cryptographers respect each other’s right to make an anonymous
payment, but want to find out whether the NSA paid. So they decide to execute
the following protocol:
– Every two cryptographers establish a shared one-bit secret by tossing an un-
biased coin and only informs the cryptographer on the right of the outcome.
– Then, each cryptographer publicly states whether the two coins that it can
see (the one it flipped and the one the left-hand neighbor flipped) agree, if
he/she did not pay.
– However, if a cryptographer actually paid for dinner, then it instead states
the opposite – disagree if the coins are the same and agree if the coins are
different.
– An even number of agrees indicates that the NSA paid, while an odd number
indicates that a cryptographer paid.
The protocol can be modeled by a DTMC with the states labeled by the
values of the Boolean variables mentioned below. In addition, the state labels Ci
for i = 1, 2, 3 indicate that cryptographer i paid, and C0 indicates that the NSA
paid. The common shared secret between two cryptographers i and j is indicated
by the label Sij . The final result of the process is indicated by a Boolean variable
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P, where P if a cryptographer paid, and ¬P otherwise. We define an information-
flow security condition that given that some cryptographer paid, the probability
that either cryptographer i or j paid are (approximately) equal irrespective of
the common shared secret between them, i.e., the results of the coin tosses. This
is specified by the following HyperPCTL∗ formula:
∀σpi11 .∀σ
pi2
2 .∀σ
pi3
3 .∀σ
pi4
4 . (Ci
pi1 ∧ Ci
pi2 ∧ Cj
pi3 ∧ Cj
pi4) ⇒(
Ppi1
(
(¬Spi1ij ∧ P
pi1)
)
≈ε P
pi2
(
(Spi2ij ∧ P
pi2)
)
≈ε P
pi3
(
(¬Spi3ij ∧ P
pi3)
)
≈ε P
pi4
(
(Spi4ij ∧ P
pi4)
))
.
(14)
where ≈ε stands for approximately equal within ε.
5.5 Randomized Cache Replacement Policy
Cache replacement policies decide which cache lines are replaced in case of a
cache miss. Randomized policies employ random replacement as a countermea-
sure against cache flush attacks. On the negative side, they also introduce per-
formance losses. Following [11], we model a cache as a Mealy machine with the
access sequence as the input. Each state of the Mealy machine represents a
unique configuration of the cache, i.e., the cache lines stored. The transition of
the Mealy machine captures a random replacement policy that for an access to
memory data in address b, (i) if it is already stored in the cache, return Hit H;
(ii) if it is not stored and the cache has free space, return Miss M and write b in
a free space, and (iii) if b is not stored and the cache is full, then returns Miss
H, and randomly overwrite a line (with uniform distribution) with b.
The performance requirement of such a policy is that, from an empty cache,
afterN steps (when the cache almost fills), in a time window of T , the probability
of observing T consecutive H should be greater than that of observing H only T−1
times in that window. This is formally expressed as:
∀σ(pi1,pi2). (Bpi1 ∧ Bpi2)⇒
(
Ppi1 ( (N) ≤T Hpi1) > Ppi2( (N) ϕpi2) + ε
)
. (15)
where ε > 0 is a parameter, ϕpi2 means there is one M for N consecutive accesses,
formally expressed as
ϕpi2 =
(
M
pi2 ∧ Hpi2 ∧ ...∧ (T−1) Hpi2
)
∨ ...∨
(
H
pi2 ∧ ...∧ (T−2) Hpi2 ∧ (T−1) Mpi2
)
where B indicates the initial state of an empty cache, and (N) represents the
N -fold composition of .
6 Statistical Model Checking
In this section, we study the SMC of HyperPCTL∗ on DTMCs. To simplify
discussions, we introduce a supplementary rule for HyperPCTL∗ by rewriting
f1(p1, ... , pm) ⋊⋉ f2(pm+1, ... , pn), the comparison of two probabilities derived
from Rules (5) and (6), as
f1(p1, ... , pm) ⋊⋉ f2(pm+1, ... , pn) ≡ (p1, ... , pn) ∈ D (16)
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where D = {(x1, ... , xn, x′1, ... , x
′
m) ∈ R
n+m | f1(x1, ... , xn) ⋊⋉ f2(x′1, ... , x
′
m)}.
This can be viewed as an application of the “currying” technique, and clearly
does not change the expressiveness. In addition, since the functions f1 and f2
are elementary, the boundary of the domain D is also elementary.
We focus on handling the probability operators in HyperPCTL∗ by sampling,
which is the main issue for the SMC of probabilistic temporal logic. The handling
of temporal operators is similar to that of HyperLTL [16], and state quantifications
can handled by exhaustive exploration on all the finite states, similar to that of
HyperPCTL [4]. Thus, they are not fully discussed due to the space limitations.
The probabilistic quantifications in HyperPCTL∗ is similar to that in HyperP-
STL proposed in [25], thus they can be handled by slightly modifying the SMC
algorithms in [25], based on confidence intervals (CI). In this work, we propose
a new SMC approach based on sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) as an
alternative. We demonstrate the idea of SMC for the rule (16), by considering
the non-nested HyperPCTL∗ formula4
(M, X, V ) |= (Ppi1ϕ1, ... ,P
pi
nϕn) ∈ D, (17)
where pii are disjoint sets of path variables for i ∈ [n]; whose initial states are
assigned by X(·). The handling of nested probability operators is similar to [25],
and thus omitted.
6.1 Indifference Region
To verify (17), we first convert it into a hypothesis testing (HT) problem. For
simplicity, we focus on the verification of bounded-time specifications ϕi. In
addition, similar to [22,21], we assume the two hypothesis are strictly separated
by an indifference region.
Assumption 1 For (18), (i) each ϕi is a bounded-time specifications without
state or path quantifications; (ii) there exists convex D0, D1 ⊆ [0, 1]n, such that
D0 ⊆ D ⊆ D1, and the Hausdorff distance dH(D0, D1) = δ > 0.5
Using Assumption 1, we derive the HT problem for verifying (17)
H0 : pϕ ∈ D0, H1 : pϕ /∈ D1, pϕ = (pϕ1 , ... , pϕn) (18)
where for i ∈ [n],
pϕi = Pr(Sl∼MX(piil))l∈[ki]
(
(M, X, V [pil 7→ Sl for l ∈ [ki]) |= ϕi
)
,
with ki = |pii| and pii = (pii1, ... , piiki)
(19)
is the satisfaction probability of ϕi. The region D1\D0 is the indifference region,
keeping pϕ statistically distinguishable from the boundary of the test region D.
Specifically, each hypothesis in (18) is composite, as it contains multiple simple
4 Clearly, this cannot be handled by any SMC algorithm for PCTL∗.
5 dH(X,Y ) = max
{
supx∈X infy∈Y ‖x− y‖2, supy∈Y infx∈X ‖x− y‖2
}
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hypothesis in the form of pϕ = p for some p ∈ Rn. Assumption 1 ensures that the
two most indifferent simple hypothesis from H0 and H1 are separated, so that
they can be distinguished by SPRT. For further discussion, let F0(p) = 0 and
F1(p) = 0 be the equations defining the boundaries ∂D0 and ∂D1, respectively.
Remark 1. Due to Assumption 1, verifying (Ppi1ϕ1, ... ,P
pinϕn) ∈ D is equiva-
lent to verifying (Ppi1ϕ1, ... ,P
pinϕn) ∈ D′, if D = D′, thus they will not be
distinguished in the rest of the paper.
Remark 2. For handling a non-convex text regionD, we can divide it into several
convex subsets, and convert (18) into several hypothesis testing problems.
6.2 SPRT
From (19), for each ϕi with i ∈ [n], the truth value can be evaluated on a ki-tuple
of finite-length sample paths S drawn fromM from the initial states give byX(·).
For each iteration, we draw such a tuple of samples for each ϕi; for N iterations,
let Ti be the number of tuples satisfying ϕi, then each Ti ∼ Binom(N, pϕi).
Below, we construct the SPRT algorithm using the samples (N, Ti)i∈[n]. Let
pM = (pM1 , ... , p
M
n ) = (T1/N, ... , Tn/N) (20)
be the maximal likelihood estimator (MLE) of pϕ. If p
M ∈ D0 from Assump-
tion 1, then the hypothesis H0 is more likely to be true. To assert H0, we identify
the two most indifferent simple hypothesis H ′1 : pϕ = q and H
′
0 : pϕ = r in H1
and H0 respectively, as shown in Figure 4, via the following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. For the drawn samples (N, Ti)i∈[n], to reject the hypothesis H1 in
the HT problem (18), it suffices to reject the simple hypothesis H ′1 : p = q, where
q = argmaxp/∈D1λ(p), (21)
with λ(·) being the log-likelihood ratio given by (2). In addition, a sufficient
condition for q from (21) is
F1(q) = 0, ∇F1(q) = C∇λ(q) = C
( Ti −Nqi
qi(1− qi)
)
i∈[n]
(22)
for some C 6= 0.
The hypothesis H ′1 in Lemma 1 should be compared with the following most
indifferent simple hypothesis H ′0 : p = r with r ∈ D0, as specified below.
Lemma 2. To reject any simple hypothesis H ′1 : p = q with q /∈ D1, (e.g., the
H ′1 from Lemma 1), it suffices to compare it with the simple hypothesis H
′
0 : p = r
with r /∈ D0 satisfying
r = argminp∈D0K(r‖q), K(r‖q) =
∑
i∈[n]
pi ln(
pi
qi
) + (1− pi) ln(
1− pi
1 − qi
). (23)
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D0 D1D
pϕ
r
q
Fig. 4. pϕ ∈ D0.
D0 D1D
pϕ
q
r
Fig. 5. pϕ /∈ D1.
Algorithm 1 SMC of (M,X, V ) |= (Ppi1ϕ1, ... ,Ppinϕn) ∈ D.
Require: Desired FP and FN ratios αFP and αFN, batch sizes B, indifference
parameter δ = dH(D0, D1).
1: N ← 0 for i ∈ [n], significance level αA ← 1.
2: while αA > αd do
3: N ← N +B.
4: for i ∈ [n] do
5: Sample path assignments Ui,N+1, ... Ui,N+B.
6: Ti ← Ti +
∑N+B
j=N+1 ϕi(Ui,j).
7: end for
8: Compute pM, q and r by (20)(21)(23) (using (22)(24)).
9: Check the condition (25).
10: end while
In addition, a sufficient condition for r from (23) is
F0(r) = 0, ∇F0(r) = C
(
ln(
ri
qi
)− ln(
1 − ri
1− qi
)
)
i∈[n]
≈ C
( ri − qi
qi(1− qi)
)
)
i∈[n]
(24)
for some C ∈ R, where “≈” holds when the Hausdorff distance of D0 and D1
from Assumption 1 is small.
In (24), the solution exists since D0 is convex from Assumption 1. On the
other hand, if pM /∈ D1, to assert H1, the above discussions follows with D1
and D0 swapped, and the two most indifferent simple hypothesis are shown in
Figure 5. To achieve the FP and FN ratios αFP and αFN, it suffices to stop and
assert by


stop and assert H0, if p
M ∈ D0 and λ(r)− λ(q) > ln
1−αFN
αFP
stop and assert H1, if p
M /∈ D1 and λ(r)− λ(q) > ln
1−αFP
αFN
draw more samples, otherwise.
(25)
The above discussion is summarized by Theorem 3 and Algorithm 1.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 1, Algorithm 1 terminates with probability 1
and has the FP and FN ratios no more than αFP and αFN.
Remark 3. For computing (21)(23), one can either use optimization or solve
via the necessary conditions (22)(24), which may have analytic solutions as the
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boundary functions F0(·) and F1(·) are elementary functions (especially when
F0(·) and F1(·) are linear functions). Since solving the optimization problem at
every iteration can be inefficient for some cases this, we can reduce the frequency
of computing the significance level by drawing samples in batches.
7 Case Studies and Evaluation
We have evaluated the proposed SMC algorithms on the case studies described
in Section 5. It is important to highlight that all these HyperPCTL∗ specifica-
tions are currently not verifiable by existing probabilistic model checkers and
SMC tools. The simulations were performed on a laptop with Intel R© CoreTM
i7-7820HQ, 2.92GHz Processor with 32GB RAM. The simulation code is avail-
able at [2]. The assertions of the proposed SMC algorithms are compared with
“the correct answers”, which are derived by extensive simulations or exhaustive
solutions. The running time, number of samples, and the accuracy of the pro-
posed algorithms (Number of correct assertions / Number of total assertions)
are estimated based on 100 runs for each SMC task. The results are given in
Tables 1 to 4, respectively. In all the setups, the estimated accuracy agrees with
the fixed desired significance levels (αFP = αFN = 0.01), except for one case in
Table 3. This is because of the statistical error of the estimated accuracy us-
ing only 100 runs. The average execution time in the worst case is less than 30
seconds.
Side-channel vulnerability. We verified the correctness of the HyperPCTL∗ spec-
ification (9) on GabFeed chat server [1]. The authentication algorithm in this
version of GabFeed has been reported to have a side channel vulnerability that
leaks the number of set bits in the secret key [24]. The vulnerability can be
exploited by the attacker by observing the execution time across different pub-
lic keys, as discussed in Section 5; hence, as with [24], we verify the security
policy (9) for a selection of security keys. We instrumented the source code to
obtain the execution time for a combination of secret key and public key, and
generate a trace in a discrete-time fashion. For a given secret key, we select a
random public key and generate a trace from it. Using this approach we were
able to show the existence of side-channel – i.e., the negation of (9) holds with
confidence level 0.99. The results are shown in Table 1.
Probabilistic noninterference. We showed violation of specification (13) for N ∈
{20, 50, 100} threads (the results are similar for l = 1). The obtained results are
presented in Table 2. The total number of states of the DTMC is at least N !,
so we simulate it using a transition-matrix-free approach to meet the memory
constraint. As the significance level decreases, namely a more accurate assertion
is asked for, the sample cost and the running time increase accordingly.
Security of dining cryptographers. We verified the correctness of the specifica-
tion (14) with i = 1, j = 2 on the model provided by [3] for N ∈ {100, 1000}
cryptographers and approximate equivalence parameter ε ∈ {0.2, 0.1, 0.0.5}. The
obtained results are summarized in Table 3. The total number of states of the
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τ ε δ Acc. No. Samples Time (s)
60 0.05 0.01 1.00 5.5e+02 0.54
60 0.05 0.001 1.00 5.5e+03 5.76
60 0.1 0.01 1.00 6.1e+02 0.60
60 0.1 0.001 1.00 6.2e+03 7.16
90 0.05 0.01 1.00 3.7e+02 0.46
90 0.05 0.001 1.00 3.7e+03 4.94
90 0.1 0.01 1.00 4.1e+02 0.48
90 0.1 0.001 1.00 4.1e+03 5.37
120 0.05 0.01 1.00 3.8e+02 6.96
120 0.05 0.001 1.00 2.2e+03 11.24
120 0.1 0.01 1.00 3.8e+02 6.05
120 0.1 0.001 1.00 2.3e+03 9.46
Table 1. Showing the violation of timing side channel vulnerability for different com-
binations of time thresholds τ seconds, approximate equivalence parameter ε and in-
difference region δ based on the average of 100 runs.
N δ Acc. No. Samples Time (s)
20 0.01 1.00 7.7e+02 0.49
20 0.001 1.00 7.6e+03 6.45
50 0.01 1.00 7.0e+02 0.48
50 0.001 1.00 6.8e+03 6.39
100 0.01 1.00 6.5e+02 0.54
100 0.001 1.00 6.6e+03 7.10
Table 2. Showing the violation of probabilistic noninterference for different combina-
tions of number of threads N and indifference region δ, based on the average of 100
runs.
DTMC is at least 2N , and we simulate it with a transition-matrix-free approach.
As the approximate equivalence parameters increases, the specification is increas-
ingly relaxed, so the sample cost and the running time decrease accordingly.
N ε Acc. No. Samples Time (s)
100 0.05 1.00 1.0e+03 0.91
100 0.1 1.00 5.2e+02 0.39
100 0.2 1.00 2.8e+02 0.14
1000 0.05 0.98 1.1e+03 3.27
1000 0.1 1.00 5.5e+02 1.52
1000 0.2 1.00 2.8e+02 0.69
Table 3. Verifying the security of dining cryptographers for different combinations of
number of cryptographers N and approximate equivalence parameter ε for indifference
region δ = 0.01, based on the average of 100 runs.
Randomized cache replacement policy. We verified the correctness of the speci-
fication (15) for the performance of random replacement cache policy described
in Section 5. The performance of random replacement policy is evaluated on
random memory accesses from a normal distribution with variance less than the
cache size, to emulate the locality of reference. With the random replacement
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T ε δ Acc. No. Samples Time (s)
10 0.05 0.01 1.00 1.1e+02 0.13
10 0.05 0.001 1.00 1.0e+03 2.56
10 0.01 0.01 1.00 1.2e+02 0.14
10 0.01 0.001 1.00 1.2e+03 2.79
20 0.05 0.01 1.00 6.0e+02 1.49
20 0.05 0.001 1.00 6.2e+03 16.73
20 0.01 0.01 0.99 1.2e+03 2.97
20 0.01 0.001 1.00 1.1e+04 28.99
Table 4. Verifying the performance of random replacement policy for different com-
binations of trace length (T ) and approximation parameter (ε) and indifference region
(δ), based on the average of 100 runs.
policy and the random access sequence, the dynamics of the cache modeled by
the Mealy machine described in Section 5 can be captured by a DTMC.
We consider the paths of the DTMC with labels H or M, depending on the
outcome of the cache access. We compared the probability of all hits to the
probability of seeing a single miss M on a fully associative cache with size 256 lines
and a program size of 1024 blocks. This can easily be extended to set associative
cache with arbitrary program size. The results are shown in 4. We observe that
the algorithm takes longer time for T = 20 than T = 10. This is because, for
shorter T , the probability of observing all hits H is more than the probability of
observing a miss M. As the trace length increases, these probabilities are closer.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the problem of statistical model checking (SMC) of hy-
perproperties on discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs). First, to reason about
probabilistic hyperproperties, we introduced the probabilistic temporal logic
HyperPCTL∗ that extends PCTL∗ by allowing explicit and simultaneous quan-
tification over paths. HyperPCTL∗ also generalizes HyperPCTL by incorporating
nested temporal and probability operators. In addition, we proposed an SMC
algorithm for HyperPCTL∗ specifications on DTMCs. Unlike existing SMC al-
gorithms for hyperproperties based on Clopper-Pearson confidence interval, we
proposed a sequential probability ratio tests (SPRT) with a new notion of indif-
ference margin. Finally, we evaluated our SMC algorithms on four case studies:
time side-channel vulnerability in encryption, probabilistic anonymity in din-
ing cryptographers, probabilistic noninterference of parallel programs, and the
performance of a random cache replacement policy.
For future work, we are currently developing SMC algorithms for verification
of timed hyperproperties in probabilistic systems. Another interesting research
avenue is developing exhaustive model checking algorithms for HyperPCTL∗. One
can also develop symbolic techniques for verification of HyperPCTL∗ specifica-
tions.
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A Review of Relevant Probabilistic and Hyper Logics
For the reader’s convenience, in this section, we recap the temporal logics relevant
to this paper, with the notations adapted to that of HyperPCTL∗.
A.1 PCTL∗
Syntax. The syntax of PCTL∗ [8] consists of state formulas Φ and path formulas
ϕ that are defined respectively over the set of atomic propositions AP by:
Φ ::= a | ¬Φ | Φ ∧ Φ | PJ (ϕ)
and
ϕ ::= Φ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ϕ U≤k ϕ
where a ∈ AP, and J ⊆ [0, 1] is an interval with rational bounds.
Semantics. The satisfaction relation |= of the PCTL∗ state and path formulas is
defined for a state and a path of a labeled DTMC M respectively by
(M, s) |= a iff a ∈ L(s)
(M, s) |= ¬Φ iff (M, s) 6|= Φ
(M, s) |= Φ1 ∧ Φ2 iff (M, s) |= Φ1 and (M, s) |= Φ2
(M, s) |= PJ(ϕ) iff Pr
(
(M, s) |= ϕ
)
∈ J
and
(M, S) |= Φ iff (M, S(0)) |= Φ
(M, S) |= ¬ϕ iff (M, S) 6|= ϕ
(M, S) |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff (M, S) |= ϕ1 and (M, S) |= ϕ2
(M, S) |= ϕ iff (M, S(1)) |= ϕ
(M, S) |= ϕ1 U≤k ϕ2 iff there exists i ≤ k such that
(
(M, S(i)) |= ϕ2
)
∧(
for all j < i, we have (M, S(j)) |= ϕ1
)
where S(i) is the i-suffix of path S.
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A.2 HyperLTL
Syntax. HyperLTL [15] formulas are defined over the set of atomic propositions
AP respectively by:
ψ ::= ∃pi. ψ | ∀pi. ψ | ϕ
and
ϕ ::= api | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ϕ U ϕ
where a ∈ AP.
Semantics. The semantics of HyperLTL is defined for a trace assignment V : Π →
(N→ 2AP) by:
V |= api iff a ∈ L(V (pi(0)))
V |= ∃pi. ψ iff there exists S ∈ T such that V [pi 7→ S] |= ψ
V |= ∀pi. ψ iff for all S ∈ T such that V [pi 7→ S] |= ψ
V |= ¬ϕ iff V 6|= ϕ
V |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 iff V |= ϕ1 and V |= ϕ2
V |= ϕ iff V (1) |= ϕ
V |= ϕ1 U ϕ2 iff there exists i ≥ 0 such that
(
T, V (i) |= ϕ2
)
∧(
for all j < i, we have V (j) |= ϕ1
)
where V (i) is the i-shift of path assignment V , defined by V (i)(pi) = (V (pi))(i).
A.3 HyperPCTL
Syntax. HyperPCTL [4] formulas are defined over the set of atomic propositions
AP respectively by:
ψ ::= aσ | ∃σ. ψ | ∀σ. ψ | ¬ψ | ψ ∧ ψ | p ⋊⋉ p
p ::= P(ϕ) | c | p+ p | p− p | p · p
ϕ ::= ψ | ψ U≤k ψ
where a ∈ AP, c ∈ Q and ⋊⋉∈ {<,>,≤,≥,=}.
Semantics. The satisfaction relation |= of HyperPCTL is defined for state and
path formulas of a labeled DTMC M respectively by:
(M, X) |= aσ iff a ∈ X(σ)
(M, X) |= ∃σ. ψ iff there exists s ∈ S such that X [σ 7→ s] |= ψ
(M, X) |= ∀σ. ψ iff for all s ∈ S such that X [σ 7→ s] |= ψ
(M, X) |= ¬ψ iff (M, X) 6|= ψ
(M, X) |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff (M, X) |= ψ1 and (M, X) |= ψ2
(M, X) |= p1 ⋊⋉ p2 iff Jp1K(M,X) ⋊⋉ Jp1K(M,X)
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JcK(M,X) = c
Jp1 + p2K(M,X) = Jp1K(M,X) + Jp2K(M,X)
Jp1 − p2K(M,X) = Jp1K(M,X) − Jp2K(M,X)
Jp1 · p2K(M,X) = Jp1K(M,X) · Jp2K(M,X)
JP(ϕ)K(M,X) = Pr
{
(Si ∈ Paths(X(pii))i∈[n] | (M,S) |= ϕ
}
(M,S) |= ϕ iff (M,S(1)) |= ϕ
(M,S) |= ϕ1 U≤k ϕ2 iff there exists i ≤ k such that
(
(M,S(i)) |= ϕ2
)
∧(
for all j < i, we have (M,S(i)) |= ϕ1
)
where S = (S1, ... , Sn) and S(i) = (S1(i), ... , Sn(i)).
B Proof of Theorem 1
To prove the theorem, we have to show that (1) every PCTL∗ formula can be
expressed in HyperPCTL (subsumption), and (2) there is at least one formula in
HyperPCTL∗ that cannot be expressed in PCTL∗ (strictness). We use the syntax
and semantics of the logics from appendix A.
B.1 Subsumption
Given the DTMC M, the satisfaction of a PCTL∗ state formula Φ for a state
s or a PCTL∗ path formula ϕ for a path S transforms to the satisfaction of a
HyperCTL∗ formula by
(M, s) |= Φ⇐⇒ (M, X [pi→ s], V ) |= T (Φ, pi) (26)
for an arbitrary V consistent to X , and
(M, S) |= ϕ⇐⇒ (M, X, V [pi → S]) |= T (ϕ, pi) (27)
for an arbitrary X consistent to V , where T defined as follows:
– T (a, pi) = api,
– T (¬ϕ, pi) = ¬T (ϕ, pi) and T (¬Φ, pi) = ¬T (¬Φ, pi),
– T (ϕ1 ∧ϕ2, pi) = T (ϕ1, pi) ∧ T (ϕ2, pi) and T (Φ1 ∧ Φ2) = T (Φ1, pi) ∧ T (Φ2, pi),
– T ( ϕ, pi) = T (ϕ, pi),
– T (ϕ1 U≤k ϕ2, pi) = T (ϕ1, pi) U≤k T (ϕ2, pi),
– T (PJ (ϕ), pi) =
(
Ppi
′
(T (ϕ, pi′)) ∈ J
)pi
, where pi′ 6= pi.
The correctness of the transformation follows directly from the semantics of the
logics.
B.2 Strictness
Now, we show that there exist formulas in HyperPCTL∗ that cannot be expressed
in PCTL∗. Consider the DTMC shown in Figure 6 and the following HyperPCTL∗
formula:
ϕ = ∀σ{pi1,pi2}.
(
Ppi1
(
initpi1 ⇒ (api11 ∧ a
pi1
2 )
)
Ppi2
(
initpi2 ⇒ api22
) = 1
2
)
.
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s0
{init}
s1
{a1}
s2
{a2}
s3
{a1, a2}
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 1 1
Fig. 6. DTMC where HyperPCTL∗ strictly subsumes PCTL∗.
Now, we prove that ϕ cannot be expressed in PCTL∗. By the syntax and semantics
of PCTL∗, it suffices to show that ϕ cannot be expressed by a formula P(ψ),
where ψ is a PCTL∗ path formula derived by concatenating a set of PCTL∗ state
formulas Φ1, ... , Φn with ∧,¬, or the temporal operators. These state formulas
are either true or false in the states s0, s1, s2, and s3. Thus, the satisfaction of ψ
defines a subset of the paths Paths(s0) = {s0sω1 , s0s
ω
2 , s0s
ω
3 } in the DTMC. Since
every path in Paths(s0) is taken with probability 1/3, formula P(ψ) can only
evaluate to a value in {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}. However, by the semantics of HyperPCTL∗,
the fractional probability on the right side of the implication has value 1/2, thus
ϕ evaluates to true and cannot be expressed by P(ψ) in PCTL∗. ⊓⊔
C Proof of Theorem 2
To prove the theorem, we have to show that (1) every HyperPCTL formula can
be expressed in HyperPCTL (subsumption), and (2) there is at least one formula
in HyperPCTL∗ that cannot be expressed in HyperPCTL (strictness). We use the
syntax and semantics of the logics from appendix A.
C.1 Subsumption
Given the DTMCM, let ψ be a HyperPCTL formula containing n state variables
σ1, ... , σn. Let f(σi) = pii for i ∈ [n] be an injective map from the state variables
to a set of n path variables {pi1, ... , pin}. Then, the satisfaction of HyperPCTL
(M, X) |= ψ transforms to the satisfaction of HyperPCTL∗ (M, X, V ) |= ψ by
(M, X) |= ϕ⇐⇒ (M, X, V ) |= T (ϕ) (28)
for an arbitrary V consistent to X , with T defined as follows
– T (aσ) = af(σ)
– T (∃σ.ψ) = ∃σf(σ).T (ψ), T (∀σ.ψ) = ∀σf(σ).T (ψ),
– T (¬ψ) = ¬T (ψ), T (ψ ∧ ψ) = T (ψ) ∧ T (ψ), T (p ⋊⋉ p) = T (p) ⋊⋉ T (p) with
⋊⋉∈ {<,>,≤,≥,=},
– T (p + p) = T (p) + T (p), T (p − p) = T (p) − T (p), T (p · p) = T (p) · T (p),
T (c) = c
– T ( ψ) = T (ψ) and T (ψ1 U≤k ψ2) = T (ψ1) U≤k T (ψ2),
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– T (P(ϕ)) = Ppi(T (ϕ)) with pi = (pi1, ... , pin).
The correctness of the transformation follows directly from the semantics of the
logics.
C.2 Strictness
As shown in appendix B, HyperPCTL∗ subsumes PCTL∗. However, HyperPCTL does
not subsume PCTL∗. More specifically, HyperPCTL cannot express the satisfaction
probability of a general formula with nested temporal operator. In addition,
HyperPCTL does not allow elementary functions of probabilities, such as log(·).
⊓⊔
D Proof of Lemma 1
From (21), H ′1 is the most likely simple hypothesis to be rejected. For solving q
from (21), by the gradient∇λ(q), the maximum of q is achieved on the boundary
∂D1 when the direction of ∇F1(q) aligns with that of ∇λ(q). ⊓⊔
E Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of the first part defers to Theorem 3. The second part derives from
computing the gradient of K(r‖q) from (23). ⊓⊔
F Proof of Theorem 3
First, consider pϕ ∈ D0. By (23), for any p ∈ D0, the expectation of the log-
likelihood ratio λ(r)− λ(q) is lower bounded by
Epϕ=p(λ(r)− λ(q)) = K(p‖q) ≥ K(r‖q) = Epϕ=r(λ(r)− λ(q)). (29)
where K(·) is from (23). Therefore, for any B > 0, we have
Prpϕ=p(λ(r)− λ(q) > B) ≥ Prpϕ=r(λ(r)− λ(q) > B). (30)
This implies that for any possible value of pϕ ∈ D0, the probability of asserting
H0 by (25) using the SPRT from Section 2.2 is no less than that of pϕ = r,
which is 1− αFP. Finally, from Assumption 1, dH(D0, D1) = δ > 0, thus q 6= r,
so the SPRT can be applied to distinguish H ′0 and H
′
1.
And the same discussion applies to the case pϕ /∈ D1. Therefore, Lemma 2
and Theorem 3 hold. ⊓⊔
